Language Augmented Prediction by Gary Lupyan
arbitrary sequence of letters by thinking 
of a sentence containing words that begin 
with those letters, or learning to tie a knot 
by thinking of a rabbit going in and out of 
a hole), and (2) explicit verbal mediation, 
i.e., “thinking in words.” Indeed, this intro-
spection of thinking in words is often so 
strong that it leads researchers to conflate 
that feeling of talking to oneself with the 
format of conceptual representations (Ryle, 
1968; e.g., Carruthers, 2002; Levinson, 1997 
for discussion).
This confusion can be clarified by con-
sidering the role language can play in gen-
erating top-down predictions (Lupyan, 
2012a,b for discussion). A growing body 
of work suggests that language inter-
faces directly with the surprisal-reducing 
machinery at the core of predictive-coding 
models. Consider a task in which one hears 
an auditory cue (e.g., a barking sound) and 
then sees a picture (e.g., a dog). The goal 
is to respond “yes” if the cue and picture 
match at a conceptual level, and “no” other-
wise (e.g., a car following a barking sound). 
The better the match between the top-down 
predictive signal and the bottom-up acti-
vation produced by the probe, the faster 
(or more accurately) subjects can respond. 
Lupyan and Thompson-Schill (2012) found 
that linguistic cues (“dog”) were more effec-
tive than non-linguistic cues (e.g., a barking 
sound, a car horn), even though both cue 
types were judged as equally predictive and 
unambiguous of the associated category. 
As the delay between the cue and probe 
was increased, the difference between the 
verbal and non-verbal-cue conditions also 
increased. Under the influence of the label 
(through hypothesized top-down effects), 
the resultant representations appeared to 
become more similar across subjects with 
increasing delays in a way that they did not 
on trials without the verbal label. This pro-
vides a basic demonstration of how verbal 
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Clark’s (in press) article makes a strong 
argument that prediction or reduction of 
“surprisal” comprises a synthesizing prin-
ciple in understanding neural mechanisms. 
But if brains – all brains – are “essentially 
prediction machines,” how do we account 
for the apparently qualitative differences 
between humans and non-human animals 
in the ability to inspect and reflect on one’s 
mental states, and to effectively foresee 
the consequences of various actions? For 
example, Spelke (2003) points out that 
although all animals find and recognize 
food, only humans developed the art and 
science of cooking. Although all animals 
have to understand (and predict!) the mate-
rial world, only humans systematize their 
knowledge as science (p. 277). But we do 
not need to go into something as complex 
as formalized science to see the wide gap 
between human and non-human minds.
Imagine the simple task of pointing to 
a red box to get a reward, while ignoring 
the blue box. We can think of success as 
the mapping between the sensory input 
and the motor output that minimizes sur-
prisal. Many animals can succeed on this 
task after being trained – their behavior 
nudged gradually by rewards until the gen-
erated predictions match the contingencies 
of the task. In contrast, humans can succeed 
without any training at all, simply by being 
told what to do!1 We often take this ability 
for granted, but without it, all human learn-
ing would require direct experience with the 
domain (e.g., see Carvalho et al., 2008 for 
an account of the laborious trial-and-error 
learning in tool-using chimpanzees). If all 
brains are surprisal-reducing machines, 
what is it about human brains that allows 
them to be guided so effectively, often fore-
going laborious trial-and-error tweaking?
A common solution is to posit that 
humans evolved a special neural mecha-
nism for re-representing information in a 
way which allows complex inferences, cogni-
tive flexibility, language, (and self-awareness 
itself; Penn et al., 2008). The solution Clark 
offers – cursorily in the target article (§3.4, 
note xxxii) and more in depth in earlier work 
(e.g., Clark, 1998) – is that language together 
with other aspects of symbolic culture aug-
ment an otherwise un-remarkable pattern-
completion, surprisal-reducing brain with 
faculties we have come to uniquely associate 
with the human mind, e.g.:
“…linguistic formulation makes complex 
thoughts available to processes of mental 
attention. [It] enables us, for example, to 
pick out different elements of complex 
thoughts and to scrutinize each in turn” 
(Clark, 1998, p. 177–198).
Clark writes that “symbol-mediated 
loops” can “enable new forms of reentrant 
processing”(§3.4), but how does this work? 
Putting aside the question of how sym-
bolic language and culture evolve in the 
first place, how might an agent’s experi-
ence with symbols augment the prediction 
machinery? Answers to this question have 
tended to focus on (1) agent-level uses of 
language: explicit linguistic strategies such 
as verbal rehearsal, and mnemonic and 
chunking strategies (e.g., remembering an 
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1It is tempting to assume that the inability to tell other 
animals what to do is a problem of communication. 
But the problem here is not communication, but that 
of flexibly activating task-relevant mappings. Langua-
ge is not necessary for communicating instructions 
for a task as simple as this, but experience with langua-
ge may be necessary for the ability to flexibly deploy 
task-relevant stimulus-response mappings without 
environmental guidance.
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labels act as “cues” (Elman, 2009) altering 
how knowledge (e.g., of what a dog looks 
like) is brought online.
This effect of labels as “cues” – aug-
menting the processing of incoming sen-
sory information – can also be observed 
in  simple visual discrimination and even 
simple detection tasks (e.g., Lupyan, 2008; 
Lupyan and Spivey, 2010). Words appear 
to serve as especially efficient category 
cues to the system, selectively activating 
the features most typical/diagnostic of 
the target category, resulting in represen-
tations that allow more efficient discrimi-
nation between the target and non-target 
stimuli or between signal and noise (Ward 
and Lupyan, 2011). Indeed it is this that 
may be responsible for the facilitatory 
role labels appear to play in the learning 
of some novel categories (Lupyan et al., 
2007; see Lupyan, 2012a for a computa-
tional model).
This approach of up- or down-regulat-
ing language can be used to partially over-
come the limitation of not having access to 
human brains unaided by language2. Even 
small linguistic tweaks can augment ongo-
ing processing even in apparently low-level 
perceptual tasks. By considering the func-
tions language has on the predictive mech-
anisms of the brain, we can gain further 
insights not just in domains where language 
acts as a tool – allowing us to do such things 
as guide behavior by writing down cooking 
recipes – but on such a fundamental ques-
tion as how it is that humans can tell each 
other what to do!
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